Moscow battle, its military-political and international significance. The collapse of the "blitzkrieg"

In terms of intensity, scope, military-political and strategic results, the Battle of Moscow is one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War. By the nature of the tasks solved by the Soviet troops, it includes the Moscow Strategic Defensive Operation and the Moscow Strategic Offensive Operation.
The Moscow strategic defensive operation was carried out with September 30 to December 5, 1941 of the year with the aim of defending Moscow and defeating the German troops of the Army Group Center advancing on it by the troops of the Western, Reserve, Bryansk and Kalinin fronts. The fighting during this operation unfolded on the front of 700-1110 km.
The German command connected the success of the entire Eastern campaign of the Wehrmacht with the capture of Moscow. To achieve these goals, Army Group Center was significantly strengthened.

Three Soviet front formations opposed the enemy 350-550 km from Moscow in a strip of 730 km: the Western Front (commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev), the Reserve Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny) and the Bryansk Front (commander Colonel General A.I. Eremenko).

Army Group Center outnumbered the opposing Soviet troops by 1.4 times in men, 1.8 times in guns and mortars, 1.7 times in tanks, and 2 times in combat aircraft. This largely predetermined the initial success of the German offensive.
Operation Typhoon has begun September 30, 1941 of the year by the offensive of the 2nd German tank group against the troops of the Bryansk Front.

For the second attack on Moscow, the enemy pulled up reserves and aimed 51 divisions at the capital, including 13 tank and 7 motorized. The superiority in enemy forces was: in people - 3.5 times, in artillery and mortars - 4.5 times, in tanks almost 2 times. Only in aviation was the enemy inferior to the Red Army. On the Volokolamsk and Tula directions, the superiority of the enemy was even greater.

By decision of the Soviet government November 7, 1941 year, it was decided to hold a parade on Red Square.

In the course of a two-month battle on the outskirts of Moscow, the fascist German group was deprived of offensive capabilities. Operation Typhoon is in crisis. The second "general" German offensive against Moscow was stopped. The initiative in hostilities began to pass to the Soviet troops. The Moscow strategic offensive operation was carried out with December 5, 1941 to January 7, 1942 in order to defeat the troops of the Army Group Center, which by the beginning of December 1941 numbered 1 million 708 thousand people, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft. It outnumbered the Soviet troops in personnel by 1.5 times, in artillery - by 1.8 times, in tanks - by 1.5 times, and only in aircraft was inferior to them by 1.6 times.
The Soviet grouping near Moscow (Western, Kalinin, Southwestern and Bryansk fronts), having made up for losses by this time due to the reserves being formed, had 1 million 100 thousand people, 7652 guns and mortars, 774 tanks and 1000 aircraft. When planning a counteroffensive, the Soviet command took into account not only the balance of forces, but also other factors: the exhaustion of the German troops, their lack of pre-prepared defensive positions, their unpreparedness for warfare in harsh winter conditions, and the high morale of the Soviet soldiers.

By January 7, 1942 the advancing Soviet troops liberated over 11 thousand settlements from the invaders, incl. the cities of Kalinin and Kaluga, eliminated the danger of the encirclement of Tula, reached the line of Selizharovo - Rzhev - the Lama River - Ruza - Borovsk - Mosalsk - Belev - Verkhovye, throwing the enemy 100 - 250 km from Moscow. A heavy defeat was inflicted on 38 enemy divisions, including 15 tank and motorized.

What is the significance of the defeat of the army of Nazi Germany near Moscow?
Firstly, here Hitler's plan of "lightning war" (blitzkrieg) against the USSR, which was successful on the battlefields in Western Europe, finally collapsed. During the battle, the best strike formations of the largest enemy grouping, the Center Army Group, which was the color and pride of the Nazi army, were defeated.
Secondly, near Moscow, the first major defeat of the Nazi army in World War II was inflicted, dispelling the myth of its invincibility, which had a great influence on the entire further course of the war. The Red Army wrested from the enemy during this period the strategic initiative, which he had owned for two years, and created the conditions for going on the general offensive, forced the German troops to go on the Soviet-German front - the main front of the war - to strategic defense, put Germany in front of the prospect protracted war, for which she was not ready.
This indisputable truth was forced to be recognized by both the allies in the fight against fascist aggression and the enemies of the Soviet Union.
Thirdly, the defeat of the German troops near Moscow dealt a blow to the morale of the soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, undermined the faith of the Nazis in the successful outcome of the aggression. It was in the Battle of Moscow that the role of the moral and psychological factor in defeating the enemy was most clearly revealed. In this battle, Soviet soldiers clearly demonstrated high patriotic consciousness, loyalty to military duty, courage, heroism, readiness to endure the hardships and hardships of war, the ability not to get lost in the most dangerous and difficult battle conditions, to overcome tank and aircraft fears, to fight against superior forces. enemy, etc.
The whole country admired the unparalleled exploits of the Panfilov heroes, divisions of the people's militia, and naval brigades. For valor and courage, many formations and units of the ground forces, three air regiments of the Western Front were transformed into guards.
In total, in the battle for Moscow, 110 especially distinguished soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Moscow was of great military-political and international significance. The victory of the Red Army near Moscow raised the prestige of the Soviet Union even higher and was an inspiring stimulus for the entire Soviet people in their further struggle against the aggressor. This victory helped to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition, aggravated the contradictions within the Hitler bloc, and forced the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey to refrain from entering the war on the side of Germany. It removed the threat of a German invasion of England and activated the liberation movement of the peoples of Europe against Hitler's tyranny.
Since the defenders of the cities of Yelets, Dmitrov, Naro-Fominsk, Kozelsk, Volokolamsk showed courage, stamina and mass heroism in the battle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by the Decree of the President of Russia, these cities were awarded the honorary title "City of Military Glory".

Blitzkrieg II Developer Nival Interactive Publisher 1C Release date September 23, 2005 Platforms PC (Windows) Genre ... Wikipedia

War Dictionary of Russian synonyms. blitzkrieg n., number of synonyms: 1 war (33) ASIS synonym dictionary. V.N. Trishin. 2013 ... Synonym dictionary

blitzkrieg- and blitzkrieg is acceptable ... Dictionary of pronunciation and stress difficulties in modern Russian

- (German Blitzkrieg from Blitz lightning and Krieg war), see Lightning war ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

From German: Blitzkrieg. Translation: Lightning war. The military strategy of combat operations, which was used by the Nazi generals during the war with France, Poland and tried to apply in the war with the USSR. This expression was already found in 1935 in ... ... Dictionary of winged words and expressions

- "BLITZKRIEG" (German Blitzkrieg, from Blitz lightning and Krieg war), see Blitz war (see LIGHTNING WAR) ... encyclopedic Dictionary

Blitzkrieg- (Blitzkrieg German) lightning war. In the English version, the blitz (the blitz) was called German raids. aviation on the cities of Great Britain in 1940. As a concept of warfare, B. was used by the Germans during the 2nd World War, especially successfully against ... ... The World History

BLITZKRIEG- (German "Blitzkrieg" "Lightning War") developed by the Nazi command military strategy of warfare, which was used by the Nazi generals during the French, Polish and Russian campaigns. For the first time the theory of "B." suggested in... Legal Encyclopedia

This term has other meanings, see Blitzkrieg (meanings). Blitzkrieg II Developer Nival Interactive Publisher 1C Release date September 23, 2005 Genre RTS ... Wikipedia

Books

• , Baryatinsky Mikhail Borisovich. This book is the most in-depth study of the strategy of "blitzkrieg", a story about the rise and fall of the Panzerwaffe, about the grandiose triumphs and crushing collapse of Hitler's blitzkrieg. ...
• Blitzkrieg Hitler. "Lightning War", Baryatinsky M.B. This book is the most profound study of the "lightning war" strategy, a story about the rise and fall of the Panzerwaffe, about the grandiose triumphs and crushing collapse of the Nazi blitzkrieg. ...

The decisive military-political event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War was the defeat of the Nazi hordes near Moscow - their first major defeat in the course of the Second World War as a whole.

By the end of April 1942, the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front were almost 5 times higher than all the losses suffered in Poland, Western Europe and the Balkans. The significance of this event cannot be overestimated. It meant that the Soviet Armed Forces thwarted the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, with the help of which German fascism intended to clear the way for world domination.

The strategy of blitzkrieg, or "blitzkrieg", aimed at the complete destruction of the Soviet state, failed. For the first time, a strategic initiative was wrested from fascist Germany, and she faced the prospect of a protracted war. The myth of the invincibility of the German military machine was also dispelled.

Why did the plan of a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR fail, which seemed to the Hitlerite military-political leadership to be a universal and unfailing means of achieving victory: the defeat of eleven European states in less than two years, reasoned in Berlin, is this not a convincing proof?

The question is far from idle. It still retains its relevance today. After all, to this day the strategy of blitzkrieg is quoted very highly in the offensive, aggressive doctrines and plans of the Western powers. The principle of blitzkrieg was at the heart of Israel's "six-day" war of conquest against the Arab countries in 1967. The same principle is now at the basis of the newest American concept of "air-ground" combat operations, which is fixed in military manuals and manuals.

It seemed to the Hitlerite leadership that a powerful, lightning strike would suffice, and success in the fight against the USSR would be assured. At the same time, Nazi Germany relied on the use of its developed military-industrial base, as well as such temporary but significant advantages as the militarization of the country, the exploitation of the military-economic resources of almost all of Western Europe, the long-term preparation of aggression, the complete mobilization of troops, the core of which had experience conduct of modern warfare, secrecy of strategic deployment and surprise attack.

A simultaneous offensive by sin groups against Moscow, Leningrad and the Donets Basin was envisaged. Together with the troops of Germany's satellites, the invading army consisted of 190 divisions, more than 4,000 tanks, and 5,000 aircraft. On the directions of the main attacks, a 5-6-fold superiority in forces was ensured.

The "victorious blitzkrieg" was given 6-8 weeks. However, in the USSR, the strategy of "blitzkrieg" was waiting for a complete collapse. During the grandiose battle near Moscow, which was fought on a front of over 1000 kilometers, Soviet troops pushed the enemy back 140-400 kilometers to the west, destroyed about 500 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, 1300 tanks, 2500 guns.

The enemy was forced to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front. In the days of the battle near Moscow, US President F. Roosevelt informed I.V. Stalin about the general enthusiasm in the United States for the success of the Red Army.

The German military leader Alfred von Schlieffen became the ancestor of the blitzkrieg, known as the "blitzkrieg". The main points of his theory are:

• The speed of offensive action.
• surprise factor.
• The concentration of a large number of shock forces.
• The inability of the enemy to mobilize and deploy the main forces to repel attacks in short lines.

The Nazis were able to successfully put their theory into practice during the capture of France and Poland in 1939-1940. The French company took 44 days, and the Polish 36.

The collapse of the "blitzkrieg" historians unanimously recognize the Battle of Moscow, which served as a turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. Marshal Zhukov attached great importance to this event, which changed the course of history.

At the cost of incredible stamina and heroic courage of Soviet soldiers attack on Moscow bogged down, a thanks to the counteroffensive, the enemy was driven back a significant distance from the borders of the capital.

In 2003, Nival Interactive released the computer game Blitzkrieg and five add-ons based on the battles that took place during World War II. Battles in the game take place on the territory of the USSR and nine other states.

Check out other interesting answers.

7 o'clock 15 minutes. 22nd of June. Directive No. 2 was transferred to the western military districts:

“On June 22, 1941, at 04:00 in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them ...

In connection with an attack unheard of in arrogance ... I order:

2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces. With powerful strikes by bomber and attack aircraft, destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groupings of his ground forces ...

Timoshenko Malenkov Zhukov.

Pay attention to the names under the directive. In the first place is no longer Marshal Shaposhnikov. He was removed from his post and is already working in the Evacuation Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Our leadership did not have complete information about the situation on the western border. By this time, there was almost no one to inflict “powerful strikes” on the Germans by the forces of our “bomber and attack aircraft” in order to “destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groupings of his ground forces”. On the first day of the war, we lost more than 1,200 aircraft, most of which were destroyed in the stands by German air strikes, whose pilots knew very well which airfield and which aircraft they were supposed to destroy. Only the Odessa military district was lucky. On Saturday, June 21, the planes were relocated in connection with the preparation for the exercises.

The sobering of our leadership came when it realized the correctness of folk wisdom that the wind of the words of the mill does not turn.

At dawn, the enemy launched an offensive in three strategic directions:

Northern - to Leningrad, Central - to Moscow, Southern - to Donbass. The balance of power was as follows:

Germans with allies - 190 deployed divisions, of which 153 are German, incl. 19 armored and 14 motorized, 37 allied divisions - Hungary, Romania and Finland. The total number of more than 5.5 million officers and soldiers. Armed with 48,200 guns and mortars, 4,260 tanks, 4,980 aircraft, 217 warships, almost 75% of which were submarines.

Red Army: 170 divisions, incl. 103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 motorized, 7 cavalry and 2 brigades of engineering and signal troops. We had an eightfold superiority in artillery, almost sixfold in tanks and in aircraft. Extremely poor provision of radio communications. Field and staff radios were of poor quality.

The first to take the blow were military sailors and border guards. The Navy of the Soviet Union met the enemy fully armed.

Black Sea. Sevastopol. Fleet locators spotted English planes still on the way in neutral waters. At 3.07 the bombers approached Sevastopol at a low altitude, but could not orient themselves, because. blackout was carried out in the city. Uninvited guests were already waiting. Searchlights flashed, anti-aircraft guns and machine guns opened fire. The planes hit the fire bag and were not difficult targets: they flew low, straight and not very fast. They arrived with heavy naval mines on parachutes, with which they intended to block the exits of warships from the bays. At 0308 the first English vulture was shot down. They began to drop sea mines anywhere, just not to die. Two and a half dozen enemy planes were shot down in the battle. Sevastopol is rightfully proud of the first downed enemy aircraft in the Great Patriotic War. They were British bombers! (Our leadership gave the British Ambassador in Moscow a good “hit in the neck”, and both sides are still silent about this fact). At 0315, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet reported to Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy, about the raid. Kuznetsov was the first to report the start of the war.

At dawn, German aircraft attacked 66 airfields.

At 14.00 June 22 Halder reported to Hitler that Air Force command reported about the destruction 800 enemy aircraft. German a The aviation managed to mine the approaches to Leningrad from the sea without loss. German losses are still 10 aircraft (from Halder's diary for 06/22/1941).

According to our official data, on the first day of the war we lost about 1200 aircraft, the vast majority were destroyed on the ground. I consider this figure to be false, because. only the Western Front on the first day of the war lost 735 aircraft, and there were 2 more fronts - the North-Western and South-Western, in which things were no better. German losses amounted to about 300 aircraft - the largest losses in a day in the Second World War. Every tenth German aircraft was destroyed as a result of air ramming (the real losses of the Germans were 15 times less than those that "composed the Kremlin storytellers." Opinion of the author).

According to the Barbarossa plan, by the end of September 1941, the advancing German troops should have already reached the lines: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan, destroying and capturing the Soviet troops fighting in this territory. There is a good Slavic proverb that everything was fine on paper, but they forgot about the ravines.

On June 23, the USSR began the mobilization of reservists from 1900 to 1913. This was supposed to give 14 million new soldiers and officers, but by the end of the calendar year.

The actions of the Soviet fronts in 1941 during the period of the "blitzkrieg"

First three weeks.

northern front

From the Barents Sea to the Karelian Isthmus. With a delay of a week, active hostilities began in the Murmansk direction of the division of the army "Norway"; June 30 in the Ukhta direction - Finnish divisions; July 1 - German and Finnish troops in the Kandalaksha direction. Two Finnish armies (15 divisions and 3 brigades) advanced on Leningrad and Petrozavodsk from the north. They were opposed by 7 of our divisions.

Fights flared up to fulfill three tasks: the capture of Lahdenpokhya, access to Lake Ladoga, the dismemberment of the Sortavala and Keksholm groupings of Soviet troops. The enemy wedged into the defense of our troops to a depth of 14-17 km, created a threat of access to Lake Ladoga, but did not complete any of the three tasks. On July 9, the enemy was stopped by our troops and was forced to go on the defensive. Only the Germans fought fiercely.

Northwestern Front

The width of the front is more than 200 km. The Wehrmacht concentrated its main efforts on the Siauliai and Vilnius directions, providing a 5-8-fold superiority. Considering the suddenness of the attack and the dispersal of the Soviet troops, the enemy began to smash the cover formations, then the main forces and, finally, the reserves.

On the first day of hostilities, the 3rd and 4th tank groups broke through the defenses of the front. On the left flank, the Germans advanced 60 km. The troops of the front were forced to hastily and disorganized retreat. Appropriate troops were thrown into battle on the move without artillery support and air cover. The troops of the 8th and 11th armies, having suffered heavy losses, continued to retreat on June 23 in divergent directions. At the junction of the Northwestern and Western fronts, a gap up to 130 km wide was formed. The enemy dominated the air. The counterattacks undertaken were not successful due to the inconsistency of actions in time and place.

The aviation of the front lost 921 aircraft in the first three days (76% of the entire fleet). The covering armies began to withdraw. By the evening of June 24, the enemy captured Kaunas and Vilnius.

The command of the North-Western Front was unable to create a defense capable of repelling the attack of the aggressor due to inept command and control, gross errors and miscalculations in assessing the situation, making decisions and executing orders, because information about the enemy was outdated and distorted. The non-stop withdrawal had a negative effect on the personnel, there was a fear of encirclement. The troops were forced to defend themselves, having no reliable logistics support, forming an army and front-line rear already in the course of hostilities. At the beginning of July 1941, due to the loss of ammunition depots, the troops had only 0.6 - 0.8 rounds of ammunition and shells.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet found itself in a difficult position. With the capture of bases in Liepaja and Riga by the enemy, the ships moved to Tallinn, and then to Leningrad, losing more than 30% of the ships during the transitions.

Western Front

The Germans attached particular importance to the defeat of this front. He opened the way to Moscow, the capital of the enemy. This was entrusted to Army Group Center, which included 2 tank groups and 2 field armies (a total of 51 settlement divisions), with two years of combat experience. They were supposed to encircle and subsequently destroy our troops between Bialystok and Minsk. Air support was provided by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had more than 1,200 aircraft.

The troops of the Western Front, not having time to turn around, took the brunt of the Wehrmacht and suffered heavy losses on the very first day of the war. They lost 735 aircraft, of which 72% were destroyed on the ground. The enemy tanks broke through into the depths of the defense. During the first light day of the war, enemy tanks captured Kobrin and advanced into the depths of Soviet territory up to 60 km. At the junction of the Northwestern and Western fronts, they widened the gap to 130 km and by the evening of June 23 they had advanced into the depths of our territory up to 120 km.

On June 23-25, the front commander, General of the Army Pavlov, brought reserves into battle and launched counterattacks with the forces of two mechanized corps, but he could not seize the initiative from the enemy and throw him back to the border. The fights were brutal. So, in the 11th mechanized corps, out of 243 tanks, 50 remained.

On June 28, the enemy managed to cut off and encircle part of the forces of the 10th Army east of Bialystok, and on June 29, his forward formations of the 3rd and 2nd Panzer Groups broke through to the area east of Minsk and closed the encirclement ring in which 26 divisions fought. 16 bloodless divisions held back the formations of the 3rd and 2nd German tank groups outside the encirclement.

The defeat of the troops of the Western Front led to a breakthrough of the strategic front in the Minsk direction, where a huge gap more than 400 km wide was formed in the defense of the Soviet troops. In early July, the Germans reached the Dnieper at the Novy Bykhov-Zhlobin section. On July 10, the enemy captured Vitebsk. Headquarters from the reserve transferred four armies and stopped the advance of the enemy.

Consequently, the troops of the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat in the initial period of the war. Of the 44 divisions, 24 were defeated, and the remaining 20 divisions lost from 30 to 90% of their personnel and assets.

I want to elaborate on the practical actions of our top leadership, headed by Stalin, in relation to the command of the Western Front (for more details on the materials of the case of General Pavlov, see the book "Tribunal for Heroes" Vyacheslav a Z Vyagintseva).

The most noble goal was pursued - the improvement of the front (Stalin's quote), but in reality - to shift the blame of the country's top leadership, headed by Stalin, onto the shoulders of the fighting generals and officers. Publicly, so that everyone knows and remembers!

How was it done? In short, in Stalin's way.

Hero of the Soviet Union General of the Army Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov, commander of the Western Front, was a Restored on July 4, 1941 Found guilty of inaction and surrender of entrusted military forces to the enemy. On July 22, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and sentenced to be shot. Sentence was carried out on the same day. Along with him, 17 more people from the command of the front and armies were shot, three shot themselves.

Stalin had to shift his own blame for the unpreparedness of the country and the armed forces for the upcoming war onto someone else's shoulders.

For this, the fabricated case had to be loud, i.e. firing squad. This is first. Secondly, the arbitrariness of the choice of the guilty, i.e. took those who were at hand. An example is the commander of the 4th army, General Korobkov. The former chief of staff of the 4th Army L. Sandalov wrote about him in his memoirs: “... According to the assignment, one army commander was intended for trial from the Western Front, and only the army commander of the 4th Army was available. The commanders of the 3rd and 10th armies were unknown where these days, and there was no communication with them. This determined the fate of Korobkov". Thirdly, we needed a reliable executor who was not afraid to shed the blood of our generals and officers. The most famous among the specialists of this profile was chief army ideologist L. 3. Mekhlis. From July 2 to 6, the commission “worked” and reported on the results:

"MOSCOW, KREMLIN, STALIN

The Military Council established the criminal activities of a number of officials, as a result of which the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat. The Military Council decided:

1) Arrest ex. Chief of Staff of the Front Klimovskikh, ex. Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Todorsky Front and Chief of Artillery of the Klich Front.

2) Put the military tribune on trial la commander of the 4th Army Korobkov, commander 9th air division Chernykh, commander of the 42nd rifle division Lazareyko, commander of the tank corps Oborin.

We ask you to approve the arrest and trial of the listed persons.

3) We have arrested Grigoriev, Head of Communications of the Front, Dorofeev, Head of the Topographical Department of the Front, Kirsanov, Head of the Department of Staffing of the Front, Yurov, Combat Training Inspector of the Air Force Headquarters, and Sheinkin, Head of the Military Department.

4) Berkovich, commander of the 8th disciplinary battalion, Dykman and his deputy Krol, head of the Minsk district medical warehouse Belyavsky, head of the district military veterinary laboratory Ovchinnikov, commander of the division of the artillery regiment Sbiraynik are brought to trial.

7.7-41g. Tymoshenko Mekhlis Ponomarenko".

Response came early : "Tymoshenko, Mekhlis, Ponomarenko

The State Defense Committee approves your measures to arrest Klimovsky, Oborin, Todorsky and others and welcomes these measures as one of the surest ways to improve front.

6 July1941. I. Stalin.

Pay attention to the dates. The telegram was sent on July 7, and the answer - on July 6, i.e. a day earlier. This is yet another proof of the predetermination of this issue.

"Question : Who is responsible for the breakthrough on the Western Front?

Answer: … the main reason for the rapid advance of German troops on our territory was the clear superiority of enemy aircraft and tanks. In addition, the Kuznetsovs (Baltic Military District) placed Lithuanian units on the left flank, which did not want to fight. After the first pressure on the left wing of the Baltic states, the Lithuanian units shot their commanders and fled. This made it possible for the German tank units to strike me from Vilnius.

Question: Were there traitorous actions on the part of your subordinates?

Answer: No, it wasn't. Some workers had some confusion in a rapidly changing environment.

Question: And what is your personal fault in breaking through the front?

Answer: I took all measures to prevent a German breakthrough. I do not consider myself guilty of the situation that has arisen at the front...

Question: If the main parts of the district were prepared for hostilities and you received the order to move out on time, then the deep penetration of German troops into Soviet territory can only be attributed to your criminal actions as front commander.

Answer: I categorically deny this accusation. I did not commit treason or betrayal.»

Stalin was in a hurry to rehabilitate himself, and even before the end of the investigation, on July 16, signed the resolution of the State Defense CommitteeNo. GKO-169 ss (№ 00 381). Pay attention to the two letters "ss" and two zeros in the decision number. They indicate that the document is top secret and is intended for a very narrow circle of leaders.

Despite the stamp “top secret”, this decision was announced for “information and educational purposes” in all companies, batteries, squadrons and air squadrons. The text was as follows:

“The State Defense Committee, on the proposal of the Commanders-in-Chief and commanders of fronts and armies, arrested and tried a military tribunal for dishonoring the title of commander, cowardice, inaction of the authorities, lack of command, the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons to the enemy without a fight and the unauthorized abandonment of military positions” of several generals and officers of the Western front, led by the commander, as well as a number of generals of the North-Western and Southern fronts.»

An analysis of the above GKO resolution allows us to conclude that Stalin did not have real information about the course of hostilities on the fronts. So, the last in the resolution is the Southern Front. Further in the text, this essay provides a description of the hostilities on the fronts, including the Southern Front. Here, very briefly, I can say that The southern front, fighting with the 11th German army, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and four Hungarian brigades successfully held them back. He was forced to retreat on the right flank in order to prevent a gap with the left flank of the Southwestern Front. The organized retreat into the depths of our territory ranged from 60 to 90 km. For comparison, by July 10, the Western Front retreated 450-600 km. Of our five fronts, the Southern Front was doing the best.

A few more words about Pavlov. He denied the allegations to the end.

In memoirs and historical studies, General Pavlov is given diametrically opposed features.

There is a popular wisdom that says that in the case of opposing opinions on one issue, the truth must be sought in the middle.

Yes, Pavlov's rapid career growth did not allow him to deeply comprehend the strategy of modern warfare and develop the practical skills of a district commander, and then a front. This is not his fault. The top leadership of the country was terribly afraid of losing power. The slightest danger from outside in this matter was eliminated under various political slogans. When such a danger arose from the side of the military, about 60 thousand marshals, generals and officers were liquidated in the case of Marshal Tukhachevsky, and 50 thousand were dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army. Went "wild" growth in the troops. This is the fault of Stalin and his clique. Pavlov came under distribution at the beginning of the war because the Western Front had the biggest losses in personnel, equipment and territory. This is not surprising. Being the commander of the district, he persistently "knocked out" in Moscow the means to create a defense in depth up to 400 km in the Belarusian military district. These funds were not given to him, because. The General Staff believed that the most likely direction of a possible offensive would be through the Kyiv military district. Two systems of SDs were created here, first of all, new military equipment was given here. In addition, our military doctrine favored offensive tactics over defensive ones. The Germans collected all the information with the help of aerial reconnaissance to decide on the direction of the main attack. They hit Moscow through Belarus, which was weakly fortified in terms of military engineering, and the worse-armed troops of the Belarusian Military District. Along the entire front line, instead of offensive operations, we were forced to engage in defensive battles and breakthroughs from the encirclement.

Plus, there is a psychological factor in the officer environment as an echo of the case of Marshal Tukhachevsky. It was lawlessness on the part of the punitive authorities against any general and officer, which led to the expectation of instructions from above, the initiative was not encouraged, reports were embellished to the detriment of objectivity about the current situation. Most feared provoke by their decisions and actions an armed conflict with Germany. For this, Stalin punished very severely (an example of the People's Commissariat of Fleet Kuznetsov).

Three reasons for the defeat of the Western Front:

Prohibition to General of the Army G.P. Pavlov to carry out measures to strengthen the cover zone of the Western OVO before the start of the war, so as not to alert the Wehrmacht;

As a consequence of the first reason, the weak combat readiness of the troops of the district;

Frequent loss of control of troops due to poor radio communications.

By July 10, fascist German troops advanced to a depth of 450-600 km, captured almost all of Belarus and created the threat of a breakthrough on the move to Smolensk.

Southwestern Front

Front feature. The grouping of front troops was one and a half times larger than the advancing troops of the Wehrmacht, 58 of our divisions against 39 conditional German ones. By the number of tank and motorized - 2.7 times, 16 tank and 8 motorized of ours against 5 tank and 4 motorized German. The Germans had only 3 infantry divisions in reserve. They took a conscious risk, because. planned a flank strike away from the deployment of our main forces, which are a defense in depth.

Knowing perfectly well the location of our troops, the Germans struck with forces 13 infantry divisions at the junction between the armies, where they were opposed by 4 rifle divisions and 1 cd. On the first day, they broke through to a depth of 30 km.

The commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos, on June 23 and 24 launched two counterattacks with the forces of 3 corps and 1 sd. This did not stop the enemy. By the end of June 24, the 1st tank group of the enemy broke through to a depth of 100 km. From June 25 to June 29, the front commander launched flank attacks from the north and south with the forces of 4 mechanized corps. Frontal counterattack resulted in the largest tank battle of the initial period of the war. The offensive of the enemy tank group was delayed until the end of June. However, the troops of the front failed to eliminate the breakthrough. In practice, the counterattack turned into scattered actions of formations: some went on the attack, others completed it, and still others pulled themselves up to its line. The 8th mechanized corps, 87th and 124th rifle divisions fought in the encirclement. 2,648 tanks were lost, many due to technical breakdowns.

This made it possible by June 30, with the forces of 7 divisions from the reserve of the front, to take up defense at the turn of Lutsk - Dubno - Kremenets - Zolochiv with a length of 200 km. German air reconnaissance determined that there was an unoccupied gap between Lutsk and Dubno. 6 tank and motorized, 3 infantry divisions of the Germans went on the offensive. On July 1, the 5th Army, with the forces of 3 mechanized corps and 1 sk, launched a counterattack on the left flank of the 1st Panzer Group and detained the enemy for two days in the Rovno and Ostrog regions. The enemy, having repulsed the scattered attacks of the formations of the 5th Army, on July 6 immediately overcame the empty fortified areas of the first line, went to the Novograd-Volyn fortified area. On July 9, the Germans captured Zhytomyr and were ready to go to Kyiv in order to capture it immediately.

From the diary of Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht:

00.13. - The Commander-in-Chief called me on the phone. The Fuhrer contacted him again and expressed extreme concern that the Panzer divisions would be sent to Kyiv and suffer useless losses (in Kyiv - 35% of the population are Jews; we will not be able to capture the bridges anyway), the Fuhrer does not want Panzer divisions to advance to Kyiv. As an exception, this can only be done for the purpose of reconnaissance and security. The 13th SS TD went to Kyiv.

11.00. - The commander-in-chief, located at the command post of Army Group South, contacted me by phone and said that this morning he received the following telephone message from the Fuhrer:

“If it turns out to be possible to encircle any significant enemy grouping west of the Bug, then the forces of the 1st Panzer Group should be concentrated and sent to the Dnieper southeast of Kyiv to encircle the city. At the same time, a strong blockade of Kyiv should be ensured in order to prevent any enemy units from the northwest from breaking into the city.

The result of the front's combat operations in the first 19 days of the war was the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles, the retreat to the old border to a depth of 300-350 km and the harsh suppression of an attempt to capture Kyiv immediately. The front delayed the advance of the enemy strike force, but stopped it only near Kyiv.

southern front

Active hostilities of the German-Romanian troops (German 11th, Romanian 3rd and 4th armies) began on July 2, so the troops of the front managed to enter the battles of the initial period of the war in a more organized manner than on other fronts.

The course of hostilities on the Southern Front was largely determined by the development of events on the neighboring Southwestern Front, so the command of the Southern Front kept half of the forces on the right wing: 4 Corps, 3 Rifle Division and an anti-tank brigade. Because of the fear of an enemy attack on the right flank, the front carried out a systematic withdrawal of troops, equaling its neighbor on the right, even having an advantage in tanks and aircraft.

As a result of fierce battles, the enemy wedged in the Balti and Mogilev-Podolsk directions. He concentrated the main forces against the 9th Army (7 enemy divisions in the first echelon on July 2). Against the 18th Army, the enemy command held extremely limited forces - mainly Hungarian troops, which included four brigades. Despite the more or less organized entry into the battle, the troops of the front retreated 60-90 km from July 2 to 10 on a 350-kilometer front. In the rest of the sector, the stability of the defense was maintained.

The Wehrmacht, due to the heroic resistance of the Red Army, did not fulfill the main task of the blitzkrieg. The first two weeks of fighting were carried out in accordance with the plan only in the Moscow direction and at the cost of much greater losses. Army Groups "North" and "South" thwarted it from the first days of the war. To this it should be added that the allies of the Germans entered the war late: the Norwegians on June 29, the Finns on June 30 and July 1, the Romanians on July 2.

Further successes of the Army Group Center due to the slowdown in the pace of the offensive of the Army Group " South" created a dangerous situation. This became possible as a result of the increased resistance of the Southwestern and Southern fronts. The troops of the Southwestern Front successfully held back the German divisions in the area of ​​the middle reaches of the Dnieper. Southern front - Hungarian and Romanian divisions in the Dniester region.

Starting from the third week of the war, the right flank of the German group in the direction of Moscow exposed more and more, tk. she was advancing faster than her neighbor on the right. The danger of a strategic flank attack by Soviet troops from the south increased. True, for this, reserves were needed for the Southwestern Front, but the available reserves of the Red Army have so far been fettered by the Japanese in the Far East and the British in the region of the Caucasian oil fields .

According to Soviet military historians, since July 7, the Kyiv defensive operation has become a strategic one, because. more and more chained the German troops to itself, the right flank of the Germans in the Moscow direction became more and more vulnerable.

July 29, 1941 Zhukov G.K. was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and appointed commander of the Reserve Front. Zhukov was well aware that he was put on the list of "penalties" for the loss of command and control in the early days of the war and would be periodically tested for loyalty to the Leader. He had only two ways - either his chest in crosses, or his head in the bushes. Zhukov chose the first path. Saving his life, he strictly followed all Stalin's instructions, not looking at the losses in personnel. Participants of the Great Patriotic War deservedly awarded him the name "The Bloodiest Marshal of the War."

Hitler decided not to risk it. When the right flank of the Central Group of German Forces in the Moscow direction was dangerously exposed, the Fuhrer was forced to suspend the attack on Moscow and from August 19 to begin the transfer of the troops of the Center group to the south.

The attack on Moscow was suspended for almost a month and a half.

Until now, a number of military historians, especially Germans, have an opinion that the failure of the blitzkrieg was due to the fact that Hitler gave preference to the economic component of the Barbarossa plan - to capture Ukrainian grain harvested in 1941, coal from Donbass, ore from Krivoy Rog, machine-building complexes of Ukraine and much more.

You are wrong, gentlemen! Hitler did not give preference to the economic component, but he was forced to save the military component of the Barbarossa plan!

Seventy years have passed. From today's position, we can more objectively assess past events. The soldiers of the Southwestern Front in 1941 inflicted irreparable damage on the Germans, holding back the advance of the German armies. The defense of Kyiv slowed down the German offensive in the south, and at that time the Wehrmacht stubbornly rushed to Moscow. As a result, by mid-August, the southern flank of Army Group Center, which was advancing on Moscow, was dangerously exposed. A flank attack by Soviet troops from the Southwestern Front would lead to a strategic encirclement of German troops in the Moscow direction. Hitler noticed this first.

From the standpoint of the classical German strategy, the bloody heroic defense of Kyiv made sense only in the case of preparing a flank attack by Soviet troops from the south against the rear of the German Moscow group. This would put an end to the German blitz victory in this war. This is the ABC of military strategy.

By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of August 19, the 40th and 38th armies of the Southwestern Front crossed over to the left bank of the Dnieper with battles. German air reconnaissance recorded this.

Hitler reacted instantly. The Fuhrer, in his two directives of August 19 and 21, changed the plan of hostilities on the Eastern Front - he canceled the attack on Moscow and set the task of eliminating the threat from the left flank of the Southwestern Front. To do this, he removes the 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Group under the command of Guderian from the Central Strategic Direction from the Novozybkov area. They received an order and launched an offensive in the direction of Konotop and Chernigov in order to reach the rear of the Southwestern Front.

Consequently, the stubborn resistance of the defenders of Kyiv and the Southwestern Front forced the Fuhrer to temporarily change the strategy of the war. He suspended the attack on Moscow and transferred troops to the Kiev direction against the Southwestern Front. The Kyiv operation broke the strategy of the fascist "blitzkrieg".

On September 10, Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction, Marshal S.M. Budyonny sent a telegram to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command justifying the need to withdraw troops from Kyiv so that they would not be surrounded. I did it decisively without fear of the consequences.

September 11 Marshal S.M. Budyonny on the apparatus of BODO, talking personally with Stalin, insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops. Stalin ordered:

"Do not leave Kyiv and do not blow up bridges without special permission from the Headquarters."

On the night of September 12, Stalin personally spoke with Kirponos on the BODO apparatus and “squeezed out” the words he needed from him: request, in connection with the expanded front to more than eight hundred kilometers, to strengthen our front with reserves. Stalin got his way.

September 13 Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Kirponos and Vasilevsky again insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops from Kyiv. On the same day, the restless Budyonny was removed from his post as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction.

Having no reserves, the Southwestern Front could not stop the advance to its rear from the south of the 1st Panzer Group under the command of Ewald von Kleist, and from the north - the 2nd Panzer Group of Heinz Guderian, who joined on September 15 in the Lokhvitsa area.

The armies of the Southwestern Front fell into the operational encirclement: the 5th, 21st (transferred from the Bryansk Front), 26th and 37th (defending Kyiv).

Stalin sent a plane for Kirponos. Everyone understood that his arrival in Moscow would end in execution, as two months ago with General Pavlov. By order of Kirponos, a wounded soldier was put on the plane. In the situation that had arisen, he could not go out to his own people and could not surrender to the Germans. He chose death in battle (author's opinion). On September 20, the commander with a rifle in his hands led the officers and soldiers in a bayonet attack. Was wounded in the leg. At about 18.30, while discussing options for a night breakthrough, he was wounded in the chest and head by fragments of a German mine. He died two minutes later.

By September 26, 1941, the Germans crushed the main centers of resistance of the front troops. The army commander of the 37th army, General Vlasov, came out with battles to his own. Was immediately hospitalized.

In the Moscow direction in early October, it got colder and heavy autumn rains began. Brought our famous roads. The German tracked vehicles had become, they could not move on such impassability. The Germans understood what our word "thaw" means.

Involuntarily, a question arises.

1. Why did Stalin not allow the evacuation of troops from Kyiv for so long?

2. Then he built a "lure" for Hitler, which cost a lot of losses?

Stalin immediately killed two "political hares".

1. A blitzkrieg was disrupted.

2. The issue of American Lend-Lease was resolved positively.

Stalin almost got US President Roosevelt to agree to the supply of weapons under Lend-Lease, his own was already sorely lacking. A dispute broke out in the United States: is it worth helping Soviet Russia with weapons? The arguments were serious - it makes no sense to send equipment, because. Russia will collapse by winter, Hitler will win and the weapons will fall to him.

Roosevelt decided to make sure that Stalin stood firm, and in August sent his assistant G. Hopkins to Russia for reconnaissance. He carefully familiarized himself with the situation in the country and at the front. At a farewell conversation, he posed the question point-blank: where will the front line be drawn by the winter of 1941/42? He personally had to convey the answer to this question to Roosevelt. Stalin replied that the front would pass west of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv.

So, Kyiv became a hostage of the promise of the Leader of the Peoples to the President of the United States.

Therefore, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command allowed Kyiv to leave only on September 18, when for three days with the troops of the 37th army of General A. Vlasov he was completely surrounded.

In the German press, the stoppage of the offensive against Moscow was presented as the Fuhrer's concern for the fatherland: to feed the German people with the Ukrainian grain of the 1941 harvest, and the industry with coal and the best iron ore in Europe. Some of our historians picked up this idea as the true reason for stopping the offensive against Moscow.

You are wrong, gentlemen. This is not a cause, but a consequence.

According to the Barbarossa plan, German troops were supposed to reach the line that day: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan. Reality was different. Leningrad and Odessa successfully fought in the siege. The troops left Kyiv, which they defended for two and a half months and broke through to the east. A week ago, bloody battles ended in the Smolensk direction. As a result of the Kyiv and Smolensk operations, the Soviet command gained time to prepare the defense of Moscow. The battles in the Far North and in Karelia were tense.

The pace of the German offensive dropped to 2 km per day.

conclusions

1. The suddenness of the attack on June 22, 1941 is the result of the loss of the leadership of the USSR to fascist Germany in open and secret diplomacy in the pre-war period.

2. The effectiveness of the German offensive at the beginning of the war is due to the weakness of the country's top leadership, which lost control over the course of hostilities for almost a decade, and the military leadership, which fights not with the mind, but with the number of dead Red Army soldiers. This is a consequence of mass repressions and purges in the Red Army before the war.

3. For the first three weeks of the war, the loss ratio was 10.3:1, not in our favor. We lost half of the tanks, aircraft and artillery, but on four fronts thwarted the blitzkrieg plan. Only in the Moscow sector were the Germans able to maintain the pace of the offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan during the first two weeks of the war.

3. The Kyiv strategic defensive operation (July 7 - September 25, 1941) stopped the German offensive in the Southwestern Front, which created a threat to the right flank of the Germans in the Moscow direction. Hitler canceled the attack on Moscow. The liberated troops struck at the rear of the Southwestern Front.

4. On September 22, 1941, the term of the Barbarossa plan ended. Its implementation failed: Leningrad was fighting, Moscow was intensively preparing for defense, after the surrender of Kyiv, fierce battles unfolded in Left-Bank Ukraine. The Volga was still very far away.

5. Specifically, he saved Moscow at the end of August and gave September to prepare for defense - the Southwestern Front. Stalin consciously donated. The "Kyiv price" of saving Moscow is more than 700 thousand people.

6. In November 1941, the USSR was officially included in the list of Lend-Lease countries.

7. On May 25, 1945, Stalin, in his famous toast on the occasion of the Victory, said: "... we had mistakes, for the first two years our army was forced to retreat, it turned out that they did not master the events, did not cope with the situation."

He was the first to talk about the mistakes, but did not talk about the reasons. They were: